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A FTER a postwar period of difficulties and losses, culminating in an
industry net operating loss of almost $21,000,000 in 1947, the
domestic trunk line air carriers have apparently rounded the corner.
With an industry net operating income for 1949 of nearly $25,000,000
and with double that amount earned in 1950, the airline industry has
glowed in a feeling of well being. Dividends are again being declared,
new equipment is being ordered in increasing quantities, and the opti-
mism reminiscent of the closing days of World War II is returning to
the industry. Moreover, this change from the pessimistic days of 1947
is an industry phenomenon. In 1949, only two of the sixteen domestic
trunkline carriers showed net operating losses and one of these had a
profit when its international operations were taken into account. Re-
ports for the first eleven months of 1950 show an even rosier prospect,
with industry profits well up over 1949, although two of the sixteen
domestic trunk airlines recorded net operating losses.
The extraordinarily good traffic in 1950, particularly in the summer
and fall months, has, of course, been largely due to the defense pro-
gram. During August of 1950, for example, every one of the domestic
carriers was in the black, including even those carriers in the southeast-
ern portion of the country for whom this month is ordinarily a low
traffic and high loss month. Regardless of the effects of the high level
of activity in 1950, brought on by the national emergency, the satisfac-
tory level of more normal 1949 may seem to indicate that the domestic
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airline industry has at long last crossed over into the ranks of.American
businesses characterized by financial stability, normal growth, and rea-
sonable profits.
But can this conclusion be drawn from the apparent prosperity of
the past two years? Is this prosperity real or does it rest in considerable
part upon public subsidy? Without attempting to deal with any pos-
sible subsidy element involved in the provision of airways or in the
financing of airports by public authorities,' it is interesting to ascertain
what the results are with considerable or all of the air mail subsidy
stripped away. While not determining what the air mail subsidy
should be and whether the subsidy elements are community subsidies,
or subsidies to the carriers, or to the air mail service, it is proposed to
examine the financial and economic position of the domestic trunk line
air carriers, after an adjustment for subsidies, the extent to which they
have reached commercial maturity, and the factors which account for
their situation. Suggestions will also be made as to the direction which
public policy might take to meet the problems posed.
Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the policy of the govern-
ment with respect to mail pay is based upon underwriting revenue
needs to enable carriers under honest, economical, and efficient man-
agement to contribute their part to the development of an air transport
system adequate for the needs of commerce, the mail service, and de-
fense of the nation. It is thus a policy of financial need, but a need
dependent upon factors of economy and adequacy.
In approaching the problem of economic factors underlying subsidy
needs of domestic trunk carriers, it must be assumed that the Civil
Aeronautics Board, as the government agency charged with the devel-
opment of a sound and economic air transportation system, is interested
in (1) a domestic trunk airline system eventually self-supporting or
(2) if that is not possible, a clear understanding as to how much of this
industry is or can be self-supporting so that the remainder of the indus-
try can be recognized as necessarily and economically subject to subsidy.
The present program of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee to study means for separating subsidy elements in air mail
payments and to draft legislation requiring separation, is a step in the
direction of clarifying this problem. Proper separation of subsidy from
service pay and the allocation of subsidies to communities will also
serve to focus attention on the weakness of the domestic airline struc-
ture. But the separation of subsidy has no definite implications for the
development of a governmental policy which will make possible the
growth of a strong and economical airline system.
How MAIL PAYMENTS AFFECT AIRLINE PROFITS
For the purposes of analysis, it is assumed here that a compensatory
(i.e., non-subsidy) air mail rate would be one equivalent on the basis of
1 These subsidies are often exaggerated by airline critics. Provision of air-
ways is so necessary for national defense that the total expenditure involved prob-
ably would not be much less if there were no commercial airlines. Airlines are
also paying a far greater share than is generally realized of airport facility costs.
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weight to the return from passenger service. It can hardly be argued
that, on a cost basis, the airlines should be entitled to more pay to han-
dle the mail than they charge passengers, unless, of course, particularly
on branch lines, the Post Office Department requires schedules pri-
marily for the purposes of the mail. On the other hand, a fair mail pay
would surely be considerably more than the amount charged for freight
because of the special service and priority given to mail. In any case,
until the matter of carrier cost of air mail service is determined, it
seems reasonable to assume for purposes of analyzing the economic
position of the carriers, that a service mail rate would be equal to the
industry ton-mile return for passengers. On this premise, the service
rate would have been 56 cents per ton-mile in 1950, 59.8 cents in 1949,
and 52.3 cents in 1947, against an actual industry average mail pay of
101.3 cents in 1950, 110.2 cents in 1949, and 70.9 cents in 1947.
In table I there is presented the actual operating results, by airlines,
for 1949 and adjusted results, assuming that all carriers had been paid
on a mail rate basis equal to the industry average passenger return.
This table, by removing most of the camouflage of air mail payments
(even though it can well be argued that the exact amount of compensa-
tory mail pay assumed cannot be supported by fact) shows some inter-
esting results. Instead of only two carriers showing losses on their
domestic operations, the number rises to 12 out of the 16 trunk line car-
riers, with only the so-called Big Four showing an operating income.
Some carriers, like Capital Airlines, have their profit picture changed
from one of a respectful net income to a large net loss. And, as might
be expected, almost all of the smaller carriers show sizeable net operat-
ing losses.
Nor is the picture much improved in 1950. As table 2 indicates,
the adjusted net income picture is greatly different from that before
adjustment. Instead of a case of 14 of the 16 domestic carriers showing
an operating profit, one finds only eight in the black after the mail pay
adjustment, for this extraordinarily profitable period in American
industrial history. Except for Northwest, whose losses are largely due
to the exceptionally costly introduction of new airplanes, the striking
change is again the case of Capital Airlines whose record turns from
one of apparent success to one of the largest losses in the industry.
While the first eleven months of 1950 depicts a more optimistic picture
than for any period since World War II, it is still significant that prob-
ably no carriers other than the Big Four were in the black after mail
pay adjustments, on a normal basis. In fact, the results for 1950 are of
little real significance since the traffic demand after the start of the Ko-
rean hostilities reached abnormal proportions. Furthermore, even in
1950, only the Big Four earned, after mail pay adjustments, a healthy
business profit.
In passing, it is interesting to note not only the dependence of three-
fourths of the domestic trunk line carriers on mail pay, but the appar-
ent lack of consistency and sense in the allocation of mail pay. Among
the Big Four, there appears to be no valid reason why Eastern should
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enjoy a higher return per ton mile than the other carriers, Although
this may be explained by Eastern's lower volume of mail, present basic
mail rates providing a sliding scale mail rate structure for the Big Four,
the mail pay seems to have little relationship to costs or need. But the
greatest disparities lie in the medium sized carriers. The comparison
of Northwest and Capital is a case at point. Both carriers are approxi-
mately the same size, as measured by revenues, but Capital's mail rate
came to approximately $4.28 per ton mile in 1949 and $2.87 in 1950,
while Northwest's was $1.17 in 1949 and $1.18 in 1950. Yet North-
west's need was obviously greater with its costly introduction of Martin
202's and Boeing Stratocruisers. Capital's rate seems to be out of line
with the rate received by the three other medium sized airlines - Delta,
National, and Braniff - all of which could surely show equivalent
need, at least in 1949.
In calling attention to the importance of air mail pay, it is not in-
tended to argue against the wisdom of air mail subsidy. Even though it
may be shown that the subsidies for the domestic trunk line carriers
approximated $20,000,000 in 1949 and appeared to be running at the
same rate in 1950, this may be a small price to pay for the development
of a first class domestic air transport system with its contribution to na-
tional defense and the commerce of the nation. Its smallness becomes
especially clear when we compare it with the $89,000,000 spent by the
government to buy and store eggs during a similar period of time and
the like millions spent on the support of prices for such articles as flax-
seed, peanuts, and potatoes.
At the same time, there is much logic in the position of the Ameri-
ran railroads that the transportation companies of this country should
pay their way and that a sound transportation system depends upon the
allocation of traffic in accordance with the relative economy and fitness
of the carrying agencies. Moreover, even the most ardent supporters of
the aviation industry wish to see the dead hand of subsidy removed
from the air transport business and to see the industry come of age as a
privately operated and financed segment of our business structure.
There may be little hope that such financial maturity will be
reached among the feederline or local service airlines, and the existence
of competition with foreign subsidized airlines may make the removal
of subsidies difficult for the American Flag carriers. But the fact that at
least four of the domestic trunkline carriers have operated for two years
without air mail subsidy (no matter how this subsidy might be meas-
ured) , gives one hope that an answer can be found whereby true trunk-
line service may be placed on its own feet.
It is proposed, therefore, in the following pages to analyze the
underlying economic and managerial factors which have determined
the profitability of the domestic trunk airlines, with a view to finding
the factors which explain profit or loss. Can the explanation be found
in size? In managerial efficiency and cost control? In equipment mod-
ernization? In route? In aggressiveness of management?
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COSTS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SIZE
Because the four airlines which seem to have found the formula for
profitable operation are the Big Four, it may very easily be assumed
that the economics of size account for airline success. In the very na-
ture of airline business, with the apparent tendencies toward lower
costs with large scale operations in such important cost elements as
maintenance, and with the possibilities of spreading indirect expenses
with high volume, it would seem that the economics of size should be of
tremendous significance.
In order to obtain some size classifications, the sixteen domestic
trunk airlines have been divided into groupings on the basis of 1949
gross revenues, available ton miles, 2 revenue ton miles and average
route miles operated. These size groupings are shown in Table 3. As
will be noted, there is a surprising variation in the size of the sixteen
domestic trunk airlines. The Big Four are definitely in a size class by
themselves and the next two largest airlines, Northwest and Capital, are
approximately one-third of the average size of the Big Four as measured
by revenues or available ton miles. The medium small airlines (Delta,
Braniff, and National) and the small airlines (Western, Chicago and
Southern, and Midcontinent) are approximately one-fifth and one-
ninth, respectively, of the average of the Big Four. And the four small-
TABLE 3 -
COMPARATIVE SIZE GROUPS: 1949
DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINES
Adjusted*
Gross Gross Available Revenue Average
Revenues Revenues Ton Miles Ton Miles Route(000,000's) (000,000's) (000,000's) (000,000's) Mileage
Large
American $99.4 $99.3 323.1 192.1 6,512
United 87.0 86.7 284.1 162.8 7,088
Trans World 63.7 63.2 196.6 115.9 5,325
Eastern 68.9 68.6 261.3 120.6 6,018
Medium
Northwest 27.4 25.9 93.2 49.7 4,003
Capital 26.9 23.0 90.9 44.8 4,132
Medium Small
Delta 15.9 14.1 53.1 23.7 3,065
Braniff 14.5 13.8 46.1 22.3 3,212
National 13.0 11.3 52.6 19.7 2,301
Small
Western 8.9 7.3 26.3 13.1 2,709
Chicago & Southern 8.6 7.1 23.5 12.0 2,539
Midcontinent 7.5 6.2 20.0 10.5 2,846
Very Small
Northeast 5.8 4.3 12.9 6.1 1,053
Continental 5.3 4.0 16.8 7.1 2,308
Colonial 4.4 3.2 11.1 5.3 1,024
Inland 2.7 2.1 5.65 3.3 1,539
* Adjusted for mail pay differences. See Table 1.
2 "Available ton miles" is the measurement of the number of tons of weight
available for revenue use multiplied by the number of miles this available weight
is carried. It is probably the best single measurement of size, since it is, in effect,
the total "production" of the airline plant, as actually operated. As will be noted
below, it is an especially good datum against which to measure costs.
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est airlines of the sixteen average little better than one-twentieth the
size of the four largest.
This is, indeed, a wide disparity in size and would seem to indicate
that only with an airline system of large companies could the public ex-
pect financial self-sufficiency now apparently enjoyed by the Big Four.
But, strangely enough, the evidence does not support the supposition
that the self-sufficiency of the Big Four is due to the economies of size.
Reference to tables 4 and 5 show some interesting facts with regard
to operating expenses. On the basis of total operating expenses per
available ton mile, there is little to choose between the four largest air-
lines, the two medium sized airlines, and the three medium small air-
lines, although the three small airlines show somewhat higher costs and
the four very small airlines have rather noticeably higher costs. It is
interesting that National Airlines has the lowest cost per available ton
mile of all sixteen airlines even though it ranks ninth in size among the
domestic carriers and is less than one-sixth the size of American as meas-
ured in available ton miles or revenues. Moreover, two of the smaller
airlines, in addition to National, Capital and Delta have costs below
those of two of the four largest.
There is even less correlation between size and cost when one con-
siders direct flying costs.8 In this case, one of the smallest airlines
(Continental) compares favorably with one of the largest (Trans
World) . While, on the basis of averages, inspection of the data in
Table 4 will show that size has some advantage in direct expenses as
well as in indirect expenses, the exceptions, such as Delta and National,
seem to indicate that size has not really been the explanation for the
financial self-sufficiency of the Big Four.
In order to see this matter of costs more clearly, break-even load
factors have been computed (see Table 4) and some detail of major
classes of operating expenses are summarized in Table 5. In order to
make the breakeven load factors have some meaning from the stand-
point of reflecting efficiency of management and operations, the actual
breakeven load factor 4 has been adjusted to give effect to differences in
mail rates and in passenger returns per passenger mile. For the purpose
of equating the effects of mail rates, the breakeven load factor of
each airline has been computed on the assumption of a mail rate
equal to the industry return for passenger service. To eliminate differ-
ences in passenger fare levels (some of which grow out of route and
competitive factors which have nothing to do with efficiency) a break-
3 Those costs generally variable with the volume of flying, although actually
most variable with hours of flying rather than miles. They include the cost of fly-
ing operations, direct equipment maintenance, and aircraft depreciation.
4 The actual breakeven load factor is that percentage of revenue utilization of
available ton miles which will just pay for expenses of operation. Clearly, the
breakeven load factor depends not only upon the level of expenses, but also
the rate at which the revenue ton miles are sold. Consequently, the level of
mail rate will affect the breakeven point, as will the level of passenger rates,
as well as other service rates, and the relative proportion of high and low rate
service sold.
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even load factor has been computed on the basis of the industry's
average passenger return, as well as with the mail pay adjustment.
The calculation of breakeven load factors, as adjusted for mail pay
and passenger return differences, shows that there is no perceptible dif-
ference between the efficiency of the Big Four and the next five me-
dium and medium small airlines. As a matter of fact the adjusted
breakeven load factors of the latter five airlines is, on the average,
slightly lower than the average of the Big Four. This is a surprising
fact, lparticularly when it is considered how much smaller these five
are than the four large leaders of the industry. It tends to prove either
that airlines of the size of Delta, National, or Braniff are large enough
to gain the economies of size in the industry, or that the managements
of the medium sized airlines have been forced by circumstances to be
more efficient than their big competitors, or, what seems most likely,
that both factors account for the difference.
Further analysis of operating expenses has been made to determine
the effect of size upon the economics of air transport services. The
major expense classifications of the sixteen domestic trunk operators
have been reduced to expenses per available ton mile and summarized
in Table 5. On the basis of the nature of the airline business, one
would expect the economies of size to be most evident in the case of
direct maintenance of flight equipment, ground operations expense,
traffic and advertising expense, and general and administrative expense.
Of all airline operations, the direct expense incurred in the main-
tenance of equipment is most like the manufacturing process in which
the economies of size have been so pronounced. Of course, there are
many custom type maintenance operations, but the overhaul of air-
frame, engines, and the other components of the airplane, of which
approximately one-half of direct maintenance costs are comprised, is
apparently best undertaken on a mass production basis. Moreover,
many of the routine maintenance operations would seem to lend them-
selves to cost reduction through large scale operations.
As for ground operations expense, in which are included the cost
of station operations and like expenses, there would seem to be distinct
advantages in the case of the larger size operations, particularly where
high traffic volume can make possible the distribution of these expenses
to many available ton miles. Traffic and advertising expenses would
likewise appear to be a type of cost which would be lower, on an
available ton mile basis, for the larger companies than for the smaller.
And general and administrative expenses, covering largely the costs of
the general offices, would seerm to be particularly susceptible to the
economies of size.
In examining direct equipment maintenance expenses for 1949,
one finds no particular evidence of the effect of economies of size. This
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startling tact, as measured by expense per available ton mile may be
summarized as follows:
Number of Number of
Carriers Below or Carriers Above
Equal to the Industry the Industry
Average Average
Large carriers 1 3
Medium size carriers 1 1
Medium small carriers 1 2
Small carriers 2 1
Very small carriers 2 2
The record is even more interesting when it is noted that in 1949
the three lowest cost carriers included United, a large carrier, and
Midcontinent and Western, relatively small carriers. While some ex-
planation for the cost differences in the direct maintenance expense
category can be traced to problems with new equipment, this is not
believed to be a significant factor. Western and United had Convairs
or DC-6's in operation. Yet their costs were among the three lowest.
Midcontinent, the lowest cost operator, had, to be sure, only DC-3's in
operation in 1949. Yet Colonial, so far as its domestic operations were
concerned, operated DC-3's almost exclusively in 1949 and had the
highest cost per available ton mile. Other comparisons could be made.
In the industry, the low cost operators are "explained away" by some
of their higher cost competitors on the basis of accounting differences,
claiming that many direct expense items are hidden away in the in-
direct expense categories. But analysis of accounts do not support the
thesis and one must look to other explanations. While, as will be noted
presently, trip distances have a material effect on all direct operating
expenses per available ton mile, the fact that no real evidence of the
economies of size are found in direct maintenance operations and that
such wide differences are found must be ascribed to the quality of
management over these operations. The statistical evidence is further
supported by inspection and knowledge 'on the part of the writer who
is well aware that good management and the provision of efficient
facilities (likewise an evidence of good management) largely explain
the maintenance cost records of such carriers as Midcontinent, West-
ern, United, and Continental.
The advantages of size tend to show more positively in the case of
ground operations expense. Classifying the carriers, as was done with
direct maintenance, one finds the following:
Number of Number of
Carriers Below or Carriers Above
Equal to the Industry the Industry
Average Average
Large carriers 4 0
Medium size carriers 0 2
Medium small carriers 1 2
Small carriers 0 3
Very small carriers 0 4
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Although the above summary appears to be rather definite evidence
of the economies of size in this important classification of expenses
(which accounted for 15 per cent of all airline expenses in 1949),
reference to table 5 will show that, in the medium and medium small
carrier categories, many of those carriers above the industry average
were only very slightly above.
It might be expected that the economies of size apparent in ground
operations expense would be due not so much to the size of the
airline itself but rather to the density of operations. Using the number
of available ton miles flown per station operated, as an index of the
density of operations in 1949, table 6 shows that, as a general rule, the
higher the density of operations, the lower the cost of ground opera-
tions per available ton mile. There are, to be sure, some noteworthy
exceptions. The exceptionally good record of National and the almost
as good record of Delta, Western, Continental, and Colonial are some-
what out of line with the general trends. But the trend is distinct
enough to indicate that the real economies of size are matters of den-
sity, rather than mere size of the total operations; and density is, of
course, largely a matter of route structure although it tends to be
affected also by the aggressiveness of management in offering a quantity
and quality of service and through effective selling. When the wide
differences in density of operations is considered. one cannot help but
wonder that some of the low density operators can keep their ground
TABLE 6
GROUND OPERATIONS EXPENSE AND DENSITY OF OPERATIONS: 1949








Arnerican ................................... 5.1 4.4
U nited ........................................ 4.2 4.4
Trans W orld .................................. 4.0 4.2
Eastern ...................................... 3.6 3.5
Medium Carriers
Northwest .................................... 2.8 4.5
Capital ....................................... 1.8 5.4
Medium Small Carriers
D elta ......................................... 1.6 4.5
Braniff ....................................... 1.6 5.0
N ational ...................................... 1.8 3.5
Small Carriers
W estern ...................................... 1.5 4.8
Chicago & Southern ............................ 1.1 6.6
Midcontinent .................................. 0.7 6.6
Very Small Carriers
Northeast ..................................... 0.6 6.6
Continental .................................... 0.5 5.4
Colonial ....................................... 0.6 5.6
Inland ........................................ 0.4 8.5
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operations costs so low and that some of the very high density opera-
tors should have costs as high as they are."
Review of traffic, sales, and advertising expenses shows in all size
classes rather little deviation from the industry average, although
there are noteworthy cases of Trans World, Midcontinent, and North-
east which are distinctly out of line on the high side in their respective
classes, and Eastern, National, Continental and Inland, which are out
of line on the low side. This group of expenses which account in the
industry for more than 15 per cent of all air line expenses appears to
be more variable with managerial policy than with size, although this
policy may be determined by route considerations and competitive
factors which are examined below.
Analysis of general and administrative costs (see table 5) shows
little difference between the four largest airlines and the five medium
sized and medium small airlines, so far as any expected economies of
size are concerned. This is somewhat surprising as one should nor-
mally expect the larger airlines to have a materially lower general and
administrative cost per available ton mile than such airlines as National
or Braniff, whose volume of operations is less than one fifth the aver-
age of the Big Four. It is not surprising that in the case of the small
and very small carriers the general and administrative expenses per
available ton mile should be higher. On the contrary, it is remarkable
that these costs should not be higher than they are.
Like maintenance expenses and the over-all picture of operating
expenses, analysis of general and administrative expense statistics
seems to indicate that (1) there are few economies of size beyond the
size of those airlines which have been here classified as medium small;
and (2) for airlines of lesser size the diseconomies of smallness tend
to show up rather rapidly. While the statistics seem to mean this,
there is some doubt that it is wholly true. It does seem to be clear
that the small and very small carriers are so caught in the costs of
small size that despite good management and sound policy (e.g. West-
ern's and Midcontinent's record on maintenance) they are doomed
to experience the few extra cents cost per available ton mile which
amounts to so much in a year's operations.
The lack of difference between the operating costs of the Big Four
and those of the next five carriers in size (and the size of these five, as
has been pointed out, is much less than that of the Big Four) is un-
convincing. From the standpoint of size, there should be greater
differences in cost. After all, even the larger airlines are not large as
American business enterprises go. Using revenues as a basis, they are
small compared to railroads and to most of the well known industrial
enterprises. Moreover, the fact that noteworthy cost records have been
made by some of the smaller carriers leads one to the belief either that
there are more important factors than size which determine airline
costs or that the quality of management varies more widely than is
sometimes supposed.
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EFFECT OF TRIP DISTANCE ON COSTS
Among the other main determinants of cost which have not been
examined are trip distances. Most direct operating expenses tend to
vary with airplane hour operating costs and the average speed of air-
planes tends to vary inversely with trip distance so that, with a given
airplane, the available ton miles produced per hour will be greater
the longer the trip distance. For example, in 1949, United Airlines
operated their DC-6 airplanes at an average direct operating cost of
approximately 80 cents per airplane mile with an average trip distance
of almost 600 miles. Because of the importance of speed over trip
distances (approximately 250 miles per hour average from take-off
to landing for 600 miles and 202 miles per hour for a 200 mile dis-
tance) , it is estimated that, had United operated these airplanes over
a 200 mile average trip distance, the cost per airplane mile would have
risen to approximately $1.00. And the cost per available ton-mile
which was approximately 10.7 cents at a 600 mile distance would have
been 13.3 cents at a 200 mile distance. Further calculations indicate
a cost of 16.7 cents per available ton mile with a 100 mile trip distance.
In view of the wide variation in direct operating costs per available
ton mile with increasing trip distances, it might be well to examine
the 1949 experience with this in mind although utilization of different
TABLE 7
EFFECT OF TRIP DISTANCE ON DIRECT OPERATING EXPENSE: 1949
DOMESTIC TRUNK LINE CARRIERS
Direct Operat-
ing Expense
Actual Direct Direct Direct Using
Operating Operating Operating Average
Expense Expense Expense of DC-6
Average Per Using DC-6 Using DC-3 and DC-3
Trip Available Cost Curve Cost Curve Cost Curves
Distance Ton Mile as Basis as Basis as Basis
(Miles) (cents) (cents) (cents) (cents)
Sixteen Domestic
Carriers 178 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
American 241 13.4 12.9 13.3 13.1
United 258 13.3 12.7 13.3 13.0
Trans World 250 15.1 12.8 13.3 13.0
Eastern 178 13.1 13.8 13.7 13.8
Northwest 245 14.4 12.9 13.3 13.1
Capital 146 13.3 14.6 14.2 14.4
Delta 147 13.4 14.6 14.2 14.4
Braniff 168 15.0 14.0 13.8 13.9
National 181 12.7 13.8 13.8 13.8
Western 185 15.5 13.7 13.7 13.7
Chicago & Southern 180 14.2 13.8 13.8 13.8
Midcontinent 151 15.2 14.5 14.1 14.3
Northeast 89 22.1 17.5 15.8 16.7
Continental 158 15.3 14.3 14.0 14.2
Colonial 129 17.8 15.3 14.5 14.9
Inland 144 16.4 14.7 14.2 14.6
Note: Curve for DC-6 and DC-3 made to pass through industry average.
Source: Calculated from wheels-off wheels-on speeds actually experienced
by airlines and reported to Civil Aeronautics Board in Form 41.
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types of equipment will tend to cloud the basic effects of trip distances.
The data on direct operating expense by carriers and the average trip
distances flown in 1949 are shown in table 7. In order to gain some
perspective on these trip distances and their effect, the expected cost
per available ton-mile has been calculated by using (1) the indu stry
direct operating expense average as the basis and (2) the slope of the
DC-6 and the DC-3 operating costs as affected by distance and average
speed. Since the aircraft being utilized by the domestic carriers prob-
ably, on the average, approximates a fleet half of DC-6's and half of
DC-3's, expected operating costs per available ton mile are computed
using an average of the expectable costs of these two airplanes as a
basis. These costs are charted on Chart 1.
CHART I
EFFECT OF TRIP DISTANCES ON DIRECT OPERATING EaPENSE8
DOMESTIC TRUNK LINE CARRIERS1 1949
Comparison of Actual with Expected Normal
25
20
"Normal" Curve Eased on Avera.Se of DC-3 and DO-610 Operatin6 Expense Per Available Ton Mile
Trip Distance Expenseo
150 14.35 178 (industry avera-e) 3 8
2 200f
250 1.300
50 100 150 200 250
-RIP DISTANCES - Mm
While the so-called "expected normal" on Chart 1 cannot reflect
individual differences in efficiency, size, weather, gasoline prices, equip-
ment utilization and other factors, it does serve to show the extent to
which trip distance enters direct operating expenses and the apparent
extent to which individual companies are below or above the normally
expectable industry average. The data in table 7 show also how route
structure tends to affect costs. The low average trip mile of many of
the carriers is almost entirely determined by route, and the deviation
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from expected "normal" of certain carriers like Northeast and Colonial
is partly due to route limitations which make it difficult to utilize
equipment as fully as possible.
The true importance of trip length in its effect on costs is some-
times buried in averages. American, for example, scheduled its Con-
vairs with an average trip length of approximately 140 miles early in
1950. Had this company been able to reschedule these airplanes to
increase trip distance by approximately 20 miles or a 14 per cent
increase, the savings on an annual basis are roughly estimated to be well
over $500,000. And could a small airline like Midcontinent improve
its scheduling, either through revision of route or through revision of
current scheduling practice, to reach the industry average (i.e. from
151 miles to 178 miles), it is estimated that expenses for the same
available ton miles as flown in 1949 would have been reduced by more
than $100,000. Such low trip mileages as Northeast's average of 89
miles in 1949 appear to be hopeless, this factor alone, overlooking
effects on utilization of equipment, accounting for an estimated 26
per cent higher direct operating expense as against what would have
been encountered had this airline been able to schedule to the indus-
try average of a 178 mile trip distance.
THE LEVEL OF INDIRECT COSTS
A further cost factor, in part related to size and in part related to
the efficiency of management, might be noted. It is the level of in-
direct costs, generally measured by the ratio of indirect to direct ex-
penses. Data reflecting this ratio may be found in table 4. The low-
ness of the ratio of indirect expenses to direct expenses accounts very
largely for the financial success throughout the years of Eastern Air-
lines and to a considerable degree for the cost record of National.
Likewise, the relative highness of indirect costs account for United's
somewhat poorer profit showing in 1949 as compared to American. If
direct operating expenses are at a reasonable level, this ratio shows
much by. way of efficient management and control of indirect costs.
Where direct expenses are high, as in the case of Northeast, a low ratio
has little real meaning. However, assuming a reasonable direct expense
level, it would appear that no airline should be satisfied with an in-
direct expense level above 100 per cent of direct and a 95 per cent
level appears entirely feasible, as is indicated by the experience of
Eastern and National. It is an interesting commentary that had all the
airlines been able to realize Eastern's indirect expense ratio, even with
the somewhat high direct expenses in certain instances, eleven of the
sixteen would have made a net operating profit in 1949, even though
a mail rate equal to the passenger return had been paid.
There is hardly any question that the indirect expense ratio should
be lower with a higher volume of operations. The record for 1949
shows that this is generally true. Most of the 12 medium and small
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airlines have an indirect expense ratio higher than the industry aver-
age and all but one of the Big Four have a ratio equal to or lower
than the industry average. There are exceptions among the smaller
carriers where the ratio is low, as in the case of National, Braniff, and
Western; and United in 1949 was the exception among the Big Four
(although it must be recognized that Trans World's actual indirect
expense per available ton mile was somewhat higher than United's, as
one would expect with that airline's lower volume of operations). The
management position of United has been, however, that a higher level
of indirect expenses is justified on the basis of the additional revenue
which higher expenses generate. As compared to Eastern or American,
United's somewhat higher expenses for passenger service, sales and
advertising, and general and administrative costs account in large part
for the differences. The extra expenditure may well pay off in higher
passenger load factors and the record seems to support the policy for
United enjoyed in 1949 the highest passenger load factor in the indus-
try. Additional cost differences lie in ground and indirect maintenance
and depreciation of ground equipment. United has probably the finest
maintenance facilities in the industry which might account for some
of these increased costs and for that company's low direct maintenance
record. Yet with all this justification, the higher volume lower cost
operation of American paid off better than United's policy as is indi-
cated by the higher net operating income enjoyed by American.
FINANCIAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND ROUTE CHARACTERISTICS
Even though the Big Four represent financial maturity and self-
sufficiency for the airlines, as their 1949 and 1950 records appear to
indicate, the answer to economic health for the other twelve carriers
does not seem to lie on the side of costs or the economics of size.5
There is, to be sure, some evidence that at least four and perhaps as
many as seven of the smallest airlines are doomed to indefinite subsidy
because of the expense level which their size, shortness of haul, and
low density of operations generate. But one is struck by the fact that
the medium sized and medium small airlines do practically as well,
from the point of view of costs, as the Big Four. Still, all except the
Big Four showed losses in 1949, after high mail payments were stripped
away, and the record for abnormal 1950 is not much more encour-
aging, when a reasonable rate of profit return is considered.
Therefore, the answer must be found in the revenue side of the
airline picture for these airlines which can and have turned in a
creditable cost performance. One does not have to look far. Examina-
tion of actual and breakeven (after mail pay adjustment) load factors
5 Similar conclusions were reached in the study by F. W. Gill and G. L. Bates,
Airline Competition (Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business
Administration, 1949), pp. 616-18. Unlike the study of Gill and Bates, this study
concludes, as is shown below, that the problem is not carrier competition per se
but rather the size and character of the market facing those carriers with inade-
quate routes.
ECONOMIC & MANAGERIAL FACTORS AFFECTING SUBSIDY 145
shown in table 4 will prove that, in 1949, every airline except the
very small four airlines would have made a profit, after mail pay
adjustment, if they had enjoyed the load factors experienced by Amer-
ican, United or Trans World. Even one of the very smallest airlines,
Continental, would have come very close to breaking even with Amer-
ican's load factor. However, had all the carriers enjoyed a load factor
only equal to Eastern's, National alone, in addition to Eastern, would
have been in the black. But in the case of Eastern and National, as has
amply been shown, their advantage is primarily one of low costs even
though their above-the-industry average passenger fare level in 1949
was of some assistance.
Why is it that three of the Big Four have gained their success
through high load factors? The answer must be found in route char-
acteristics, the quality and volume of service, or successful sales effort.
A fairly accurate guide to the traffic potentials of each of the do-
mestic trunk line routes can be obtained from the traffic surveys made
each March and September by the Civil Aeronautics Board.6 While
these surveys cover only passenger traffic and have been made for only
these two months each year, they do serve to show the flow of airline
traffic. These surveys, to be sure, cover only the actual traffic handled
and are not necessarily a good guide to potential traffic which is influ-
enced by the quality and quantity of airline operations and other
factors, such as safety, reliability and fare level which affect the volume
of airline service generally.
The best guide for determining the strength of an airline route is
the volume of traffic available between pairs of cities. The Civil
Aeronautics Board Survey for March, 1949, covered traffic to and from
430 domestic cities having airline traffic between 15,532 pairs of cities.
While some of these cities and pairs were served by the local service
airlines, most were served by the sixteen domestic trunk line carriers
studied here and by far most of the traffic handled was carried by these
major carriers. Data from the September, 1948 and March, 1949, sur-
veys have been summarized in tables 8 and 9. The importance of rela-
tively few cities is striking. Of the 430 cities surveyed in March, 1949.
ten of these cities generated 53 per cent of the domestic airline pas-
senger miles and 100 of these cities generated 93 per cent of the pas-
senger miles. Of the 15,532 pairs of cities surveyed, 100 pairs handled
47 per cent of the passenger miles. Thus, it appears reasonable to con-
clude that an airline route with the highest number of these major
cities or pairs of cities is likely to have the highest density of traffic,
the largest volume, and the highest average load factors.
Table 8, dealing only with the intercity route passenger traffic of
the domestic trunk line carriers over the top 100 pairs of cities in
September, 1948, and March, 1949, shows, as might be expected, the
0 Civil Aeronautics Board, Airline Traffic Survey (Washington: Sup't of Doc-
uments).
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overwhelming route strength of the Big Four airlines and the great
route weakness of such carriers as Continental, Midcontinent, and
Inland. By arbitrarily allocating actual traffic among carriers on an
equal basis, one obtains not only a prorated potential but also a
competitive factor as disclosed by the average number of carriers serv-
ing each route. While the traffic of the top 100 pairs only covers 47
per cent of the total traffic, the importance of this top 2/3 of 1 per cent
of the pairs is extraordinarily great to the route productivity of an
airline.
The average number of carriers serving these top pairs is of signifi-
cance. The strength of Eastern's route, among the Big Four, becomes
apparent when it is noted that this airline has less competition over
its route than any of the largest airlines; in fact, less competition than
any of its competitors. Likewise, the weakness of Capital's and North-
east's route is alo partly apparent when one finds an average of three
carriers serving their most productive route segments. Based on an
equal proration of traffic handled over, the 100 pairs, the strength of
National's route appears to be greater than has generally been realized.
For the survey months covered, one finds National's route to stand, in
terms of potential, as fifth in the nation and with a very low competi-
tive factor of 1.8. The extraordinary weakness of Continental's and
Inland's routes, without a single pair of cities in the top 100, doubtless
accounts to a great extent for the low load factors and traffic densities
which these carriers have.
To obtain a clearer picture of the relative route strengths of the
various carriers, the distribution of the cities and pairs of cities by size
groups has been made and summarized in table 9. The distribution of
the pairs of cities in the top 100 pairs brings out even more sharply
the traffic strength of the routes of the Big Four. Likewise it discloses
the weaknesses of the smallest four and the small and medium small
airlines. Except for Northeast's Boston-New York segment and Co-
lonial's New York-Montreal route, none of the six smallest airlines
have any of the top 50 pairs of cities on their routes.
Although the traffic generating ability of cities on an airline's route
is of far less importance than the linking up of strong traffic generating
cities (e.g. it is of far less significance for an airline to serve a city
than to serve that city and another between which passengers wish
to travel), some weight must be attached to the kind of traffic genera-
tion cities an airline has on its route. As will be noticed from table 9,
both American and United have on their routes 8 of the top 10 cities
of the country which generated 53 per cent of the passenger miles in
March, 1949. Of the top 100 traffic generating cities, the routes of
American and Eastern are noteworthy, as is the fact that Capital has
more of these cities than Trans World and almost as many as United.
However, as will be recalled from table 8, Capital does not have the
strong pairs of cities and has a higher degree of competition over its
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good route segments. United's route which has 38 of the cities ranking
101 to 430, and generating only 7 per cent of the industry passenger
miles, shows some weakness as compared to American and Trans
World. One notes also, as a general rule, that the smaller airlines serv-
ing only a few of the top 50 or 100 of the traffic generating cities have
more than their proportionate share of the weak traffic generating
cities.
Study of the data summarized in tables 8 and 9 leads one to the
following conclusions with regard to route strength: (1) the routes of
the Big Four are considerably stronger than those of the other twelve
airlines and doubtless account not only for their volume of operations
but their relatively high load factors; (2) the routes of the smallest
four are so weak that a reasonable load factor or density of traffic can
hardly be expected; (3) certain airlines, like National, have a better
route than the size of their operations would indicate; (4) the develop-
ment of routes under the Civil Aeronautics Board has not only been
widely varying as to expectable traffic volume but also as to the extent
of competition, as is indicated by Eastern's ratio of 1.8 carriers serving
major pairs and Braniff's 1.7 against Capital's 3.1 and Northeast's 3.0:
(5) there has apparently been no attempt by the Civil Aeronautics
Board to allocate the weaker traffic. generating cities in such a way as
to bring about routes of equal strength, regardless of size and (6) nei-
ther from the standpoint of traffic density nor the character of demand
can normal (i.e. in a peacetime economy) load factors adequate to
cover the present level of costs be expected for the majority of airlines
in the medium small, small and very small categories.
STRENGTH OF ROUTE THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR
The lack of evidence that size alone accounts for the wide discrep-
ancy in profit potentials not based on mail pay, the good load factors
of the Big Four and their resultant profits, and the clearly superior
route characteristics of the largest four airlines, lead to the belief that
route, more than any other factor explains the profit or loss character-
istics of domestic trunk airlines.
While route is clearly the most important single factor, one should
not overlook aggressiveness in quality and quantity of service. It is
a well proved phenomenon in transportation that, given equal route
opportunities, the company offering the largest volume of service at a
reasonably good quality will get the business. Volume is often more
important than quality, for volume of service ordinarily means fre-
quency of service and the travelling and shipping public is more
likely to use the carrier with the highest frequency. While the advan-
tages of frequency diminish with time and distance (e.g. there cart
hardly be too much frequency to suit travel tastes between New York
and Washington, but perhaps three or four well timed frequencies
each day between New York and Los Angeles will cover all normal
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travel demands for frequent service), transportation is a true case of
that company getting most which offers most.
THE FACTOR OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN OFFERING SERVICE
There is no adequate mcasure of the aggressiveness of carriers in
offering service. For those carriers which have a proportionately equal
number of the top ranking pairs of passenger traffic cities on their
routes, a ratio between the total passenger miles of traffic carried in
the two survey months studied here and the potential based on equal
proration of traffic carried gives a fair index. Thus, for the airlines
as a whole, the top ranking pairs (see table 8) accounted for approxi-
mately 47 per cent of the total traffic carried in these two months; and
the ratio of total traffic to traffic for the top 97 pairs was 2.10. It is
interesting that American was slightly above the industry ratio, while
Eastern, United, and Capital were a little below, and Trans World,
Western, and National were considerably below. Ratios for such car-
riers as Delta, Braniff, and Midcontinent have rather little meaning
because of the proportion of traffic carried on less productive pairs of
cities. But the low ratios of Trans World, Western, and National indi-
cate that these carriers are not getting their fair share of the business
through a lack of equipment and volume of service, unequal competi-
tion (e.g. United's stronger position than Western on the west coast
because of its national prestige) , or an inferior grade of sales promo-
tion. As a matter of fact, study of the industry indicates that, with
Trans World and National particularly, the principal problem has
been a lack of first grade equipment to offer adequate competition over
their most productive route segments.
Although over-all statistical measures are clouded with operating
policies over branch lines and the practice of offering limited service on
noncompetitive lines, the policies of most airlines in offering volume
and quantity of service are fairly well known and can be ascertained
from direct observation and study. Both American and Eastern have
followed a policy of offering a high volume of service, particularly on
competitive lines and the experience of many travellers is that, in the
areas in which these carriers operate, competitors find it difficult to
match these carriers' attraction through frequency and volume of serv-
ice. United has apparently followed the policy of offering an excep-
tionally high quality of service, with a fair degree of volume on com-
petitive routes, and a limited volume and frequency on noncompetitive
routes. Trans World Airline has been hampered for many years by a
lack of equipment (although this lack is currently being remedied)
which has clearly not made it possible for this airline to follow a policy
of high volume service, even though the management might wish to
do so.
Capital Airlines has shown signs that its problem is not an ability
to place a volume of service on its routes, but its financial position and
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the necessity for reducing costs, as well as its highly competitive and
rambling route structure, have led this airline to offer a grade of service
somewhat inferior to its competitors. Northwest appears to be doing
as well as can be expected from the standpoint of volume and quality
of service, with its problems being route limitations and the incidenrA
of high operating costs due to the introduction of two new and costly
types of aircraft.
The outstanding case of being placed in an inferior position be-
cause of lack of volume of service is National whose small fleet of
DC-6's and lack of other modern aircraft, as well as its small fleet of
aircraft for the size and potential of its route, have placed it at a
competitive disadvantage. Western has also not offered the volume of
service which its route would seem to warrant, although, as has been
pointed out, its problem of competing against nationally strong United
on the west coast may overshadow any policy which the management
might like to pursue. There is some evidence that both Delta and
Braniff have followed too conservative a policy in putting modern
aircraft into the better segments of their routes in volume large
enough to meet the competition of such strong carriers as American
and Eastern. As for the other airlines, there has naturally been some
reluctance to meet the quantitative competition of large competitors,
since, by and large, their routes are so weak that a strong promotional
policy would be hazardous. Yet, one finds surprising cases of high
quality and relatively high volume service among these carriers.
Among such cases might be noted Continental and Midcontinent.
SUMMARY OF FACTORS AFFECTING PROFITABILITY
In summary, the answer to airline profitability and the ability of
the domestic trunk airlines to stand on their own feet lies primarily
in route structure. There are noteworthy cases of good and aggressive
management and of extraordinary cost control. Virtually any airline
which could combine United's or Western's low maintenance costs,
National's low direct flying cost, and Eastern's low level of indirect
cost could earn a profit with even the load factors experienced. But
route characteristics necessarily affect these costs. Northeast, with a
short trip route structure could never expect low direct flying costs.
An efficiently operated airline like Continental could hardly expect
Eastern's level of indirect costs because of the low traffic density of
its route.
Moreover, there can hardly be doubt that the use of modern equip-
ment has helped the cost and improved the load factors of such carriers
as American and United. The domestic airline industry is far from
modernized with more DC-3's and DC-4's in operation than all postwar
airplanes combined.7 The railroads were slow to learn, although many
7 Although, to be sure, by mid-1949, more passenger miles were being carried
in the larger and more efficient modern aircraft, such as Constellations, DC-6's
and Convairliners.
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now have, how new equipment can reduce costs and improve service.
The airlines, traditionally aggressive, show signs in some quarters of
falling into the lethargy of using old equipment indefinitely. And a
mail pay system which emphasizes need and puts a premium on not try-
ing the new does not help in developing aggressive management look-
ing for new ways to lower costs and improve service.
As the analysis of the traffic generating possibilities of the various
airline routes indicates, the problem of route inadequacy is not particu-
larly one of multiple carrier competition. 8 There are doubtless routes
upon which too much competition exists, in the sense that all the
advantages of competition could be obtained with fewer carriers and
some advantages would result through remaining carriers handling
traffic at a higher density. But this is not the major problem. The
problem is rather the size and character of the market facing each indi-
vidual carrier. In general, the weaker twelve of the sixteen domestic
air carriers, and particularly the weakest seven, have facing them a mar-
ket so inadequate from the standpoint of volume and density of traffic
that they can hardly expect a load factor which will return revenue ade-
quate to meet their costs.
To illustrate the conclusion that the problem is not so much the
intensity of intercarrier competition, but rather that of market, the case
of Continental Airlines might be used. This airline is among those
with the least competition from air carriers on its lines (the data in
Table 8 will not show this, since only the top 100 pairs of cities are con-
sidered,,although complete analysis of Continental's system will reveal
it). This airline had none of the top 100 pairs on it and only seven of
the top 50 traffic generating cities, from which 84% of airline passenger
miles came in March, 1949, were on its line. Yet it served 29 cities
among the weakest 330 points generating only 7% of all airline passen-
ger miles in the country. This airline is one of the best managed and
most efficient airlines in the nation; still it is probably safe to say that
in normal times the size of the demand facing this company cannot sup-
port a profitable business without some mail pay assistance.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from most of the other weaker
carriers. Only in the case of Capital does it seem probable that the
intensity of inter-carrier competition explains, in part, its weakness.
And even in this case it is far from certain that the relatively few heavy
traffic generating pairs of cities and the relatively large number of weak
route segments may be more important than the intensity of competi-
tion.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY: CONSOLIDATION
If profitability, economy, and self-sufficiency for the domestic trunk
line carriers depend so much upon improved routes, the answer for
public policy seems to be simple in principle. With the exception of a
8 As found by Gill and Bates, supra.
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few segments which could stand additional service, the need for route
improvement should not, of course, be met through new and additional
routes for the weaker carriers but by a definite public policy for consoli-
dation. A mere glance at the wide differences in route and size is suffi-
cient to arouse suspicion that the present policy of continuing sixteen
trunkline carriers will never lead to economic self-sufficiency for the
airlines. And examination of the underlying factors amply supports
the need for overhaul of the airline route structure.
Let us see how this policy might work. The Civil Aeronautics
Board, whose responsibility it is to develop and foster such a program,
must have a plan. This plan, to be practical, should not be based upon
the premise of cutting up currently successful and well operated air-
lines, but rather upon the basis that the smaller airlines which cannot
hope for self-sufficiency in normal times should be merged so as to make
a system of strong airlines. It might also be necessary, although it is by
no means clearly so, to force the abandonment of certain route seg-
ments, or to place them in the category of local service airlines whose
service it is the intention of the government to support as a public serv-
ice to small communities.
For example, suppose that some way could be found to force the
merger of Northeast, Colonial, National, Delta, Chicago and Southern
and Capital (except for those lines Chicago-Detroit-Cleveland-Pitts-
burgh-New York) into an airline system similar to Eastern's sys-
tem. Such a system would be a strong north-south carrier in the
eastern half of the United States. Analysis of the September, 1948
and March, 1949 Airline Surveys of the Civil Aeronautics Board
indicates (see Table 10) that such a system would serve an average
of 27.5 of the top 100 pairs with a prorated potential of more than
70 million passenger miles for the two months; a system with
enough potential volume and traffic density to promise economic self-
sufficiency.
Likewise, if a merger were forced between Northwest and Western
(including Inland), plus Capital's route Chicago-Detroit-Cleveland-
Pittsburgh-New York, along with a new route from San Francisco-
Salt Lake-Denver-Chicago and certain transcontinental nonstop priv-
ileges, there would emerge a fourth transcontinental airline almost as
strong as United.
These two merger programs, bringing a strong eastern and a strong
transcontinental carrier out of nine smaller carriers would make a logi-
cal pattern with a minimum of cutting up of present carriers. Midcon-
tinent, Braniff, and Continental have not been allocated in the
suggested transcontinental and eastern mergers, although there might
be some logic in-doing so, since it is believed that a system so resulting
would be rather too large, in comparison with the present transconti-
nental carriers. Consequently, for the purpose of this suggested plan,
it is assumed that Continental is assigned to Trans World, along with
most of Braniff's routes, and Midcontinent is allocated to Eastern,
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along with Braniff's Chicago-Kansas City and Memphis-Tulsa routes.
The result of so doing would be to strengthen both Trans World and
Eastern in areas where the strength would be of material benefit to
them.
While the above suggested mergers are not offered as a rigid plan,
they do tend to show how a plan of mergers can bring forth a smaller
number of large airlines, drawing upon the important traffic generating
centers and traffic routes so as to make them strong. The relative
strengths of the routes, revamped as suggested, is shown in Table 10.
Using as a fairly good index of route strength the potential served by
the top 100 pairs of cities in the September, 1948 and March, 1949 Air-
line Surveys, one finds a surprising degree of equality in the route
strengths of the six airline systems.
While such a merger program, apparently drastic in nature, would
reduce the domestic trunk line carriers from sixteen to six, it would not
reduce competition in many of those route segments were competition
now exists. In fact, in the major route segments, exemplified by the
top ranking 100 pairs, the merger program would slightly increase com-
petition. Comparison of the competitive factor (average number of
carriers serving pairs of cities) in Table 10 with those in Table 8 shows
a slight rise in the element of competition. Yet, even with this rise in
competition, the pro-rated share of traffic remains high for all carriers,
even though that of American, United and Eastern is slightly higher
TABLE 10
PROPOSED DOMESTIC TRUNK AIRLINE ROUTE STRUCTURE
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PASSENGER MILE POTENTIAL OF AIR CARRIER ROUTES
AS MEASURED BY INTERCITY ROUTE TRAFFIC OF Top 100 RANKING PAIRS OF CITIES
IN SEPTEMBER 1948 AND MARCH 1949 AIRLINE SURVEYS
Average Total Potential Average
Number Passenger to Airline Number of
of Top Miles of Based on Carriers
100 Pairs Pairs Equal Serving
Served Served Proration Pairs(000,000's) (000,000's)
American 43.5 269.5 98.7 2.7
United 38 256.9 87.6 2.9Trans World (1) 40 240.3 85.5 2.8Eastern (2) 26.5 155.9 70.8 2.2
Combination A(3) 27.5 153.6 70.1 2.2Combination B (4) 33 242.8 90.1 2.7(1) Present route plus all of Continental and Braniff's route Kansas City-
Wichita-Oklahoma City-Fort Worth/Dallas-Houston and Tulsa-Oklahoma City-
Denver.
(2) Present route plus all of Midcontinent and Braniff's route Chicago-
Kansas City, and Memphis-Tulsa.
(3) A combination of domestic routes of Northwest, Colonial, Delta, National,
Chicago and Southern, and Capital (except Chicago-Detroit-Cleveland-Pittsburgh-New York plus a new route Cleveland-Cincinnati.
(4) A combination of Northwest and Western (including Inland) plusCapital's route Chicago-Detroit-Cleveland-Pittsburgh-New York plus a new route
San Francisco--Salt Lake City-Denver-Chicago, also nonstop flights permitted(in addition to present nonstops) New York-Los Angeles, New York-San Fran-
cisco, Chicago-San Francisco, Chicago-Los Angeles, and New York-Chicago.
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under present circumstances, than could be the case if this program of
mergers were effected.
Since it is believed that a program of mergers, somewhat along the
lines of that suggested here, is the only answer to airline financial and
economic self-sufficiency, there is immediately the question as to how
any such merger might be effected. In the first place, it is the responsi-
bility of the Civil Aeronautics Board to come forward with a plan.
Unless airlines know what the Civil Aeronautics Board will approve,
no one is likely to undertake the trouble and expense of putting to-
gether a successful merger only to find that the government agency in
charge of civil air transportation will not approve it. In the past ten
years there has not been a single major airline merger among the trunk
airlines, although plans for a few have been announced and others have
been abandoned because of the attitude of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
There is certainly no reason, legally or politically, why the Board
should not study the problem of strengthening routes through the con-
solidation process. There appears to be -no reason, except lethargy,
why the Board should not come out with a positive statement that it
will look with favor on consolidations which follow a particular plan.
The development of such a plan cannot do harm and can surely do
some good, especially when it is realized how strong a few well selected
mergers can make an airline.
But, so long as consolidation is voluntary, there is no more reason to
expect a series of consolidations according to plan than developed in
the railroad industry after the Transportation Act of 1920. It is no se-
cret that the airline industry is still led by men, most of whom were pio-
neers in aviation, and who like the idea of being head of an airline no
matter how small or how economically insufficient the company is.
While the abilities of these leaders are often great, their interest in pro-
tecting their position argues against any hope of any program of volun-
tary consolidation, even on a modest scale.
However, unlike the railroad industry in which a voluntary consoli-
dation plan failed, the domestic trunk airline industry, except for the
four largest carriers, appears to be dependent, at least in normal times
upon a level of air mail pay higher than that which would normally be
paid for the service. And the Federal Government is unwittingly the
principal party in supporting an economically unstable industry
through its mail payments. Since the power to withhold subsidy funds
is one of the most effective instruments of control, and since the Civil
Aeronautics Act provides for mail pay only under economical and effi-
cient management, it appears that the Board has ample power now
without any further legislation to force a plan of consolidation.
The threat to withhold excess mail pay would probably be an am-
ple regulatory tool to force consolidation. Should the threat be insuffi-
cient, the actual withholding of mail pay subsidies would surely work
even though a carrier might be forced into bankruptcy or trusteeship in
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the meanwhile. There is a curious feeling in government and industry
circles that an airline cannot be allowed to go bankrupt. There ap-
pears to be no basis in law or public policy for this attitude, for the
Civil Aeronautics Act does not guarantee profits under all circum-
stances and financial reorganization need not affect operation of a pub-
lic service.
Consolidation of the domestic trunk airlines into six large systems,
through giving each airline a share in the lucrative haul between the
major pairs of cities of the United States, would probably make for
such strong airlines economically that the local service hauls for which
these airlines are now certificated could be handled without causing
loss to any system as a whole. If, after a period of trial, it should be
proved that these local services so burden an airline that action is called
for, the Civil Aeronautics Board could then decide upon an appropri-
ate course of action. It would seem that, in such an event, either these
services should be abandoned or, if required as a public service, should
be paid for by separate subsidies. Such subsidies would be specific and
for a definite service and not, as present subsidies, to place an umbrella
over the efficient and inefficient alike.
If, as this analysis indicates, the basic cause for the need for air mail
payments above a service rate of pay is the weakness of the routes of all
but the four largest carriers the way for bringing economic self-suffi-
ciency to the domestic trunk airlines is clear. All that is needed is a
plan and the will to make payment of mail subsidy contingent upon a
reasonable conformance with such a plan in a reasonable period of
time. The Civil Aeronautics Board can act if it will.
